Pandemic influenza: Studying the lessons of history by Morse, Stephen S.
Pandemic influenza: Studying the lessons of history
Stephen S. Morse 
doi:10.1073/pnas.0702659104 
 2007;104;7313-7314; originally published online Apr 25, 2007; PNAS




etc., can be found at: 
High-resolution figures, a citation map, links to PubMed and Google Scholar,
 Related Articles
 www.pnas.org/cgi/content/abstract/104/18/7582
A related article has been published: 
 References
 www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/104/18/7313#BIBL
This article cites 11 articles, 4 of which you can access for free at: 
 www.pnas.org/cgi/content/full/104/18/7313#otherarticles
This article has been cited by other articles: 
 E-mail Alerts
. click hereat the top right corner of the article or
Receive free email alerts when new articles cite this article - sign up in the box
 Rights & Permissions
 www.pnas.org/misc/rightperm.shtml
To reproduce this article in part (figures, tables) or in entirety, see: 
 Reprints
 www.pnas.org/misc/reprints.shtml
To order reprints, see: 
 Notes:
Pandemic influenza: Studying the lessons of history
Stephen S. Morse*
Department of Epidemiology and Center for Public Health Preparedness, Mailman School of Public Health,
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N
ext year will mark the 90th an-
niversary of the great influenza
pandemic of 1918, an event
widely considered to be one of
the greatest natural disasters in human
history. Historians estimate that 50 mil-
lion people died worldwide, including
450,000 documented deaths in the
United States alone (1). Since then, the
20th century witnessed two more influ-
enza pandemics, although fortunately
none comparable in ferocity to the 1918
pandemic (2). Pandemics—epidemics so
large that virtually the entire world is
affected—have occurred several times in
each of the last several centuries. Most
virologists therefore believe that it is inev-
itable that we will experience at least one
pandemic in this century, and very likely
more. However, if a pandemic were to
strike in the near future, it is likely that
vaccine would not be available for at least
4–6 months (3). Antivirals, if effective
against the pandemic strain, would proba-
bly also be in short supply. Few of these
measures can be applied at pandemic
scale, in which half the population of the
world would likely be infected over the
course of a year or more. We would be
left with other measures, now termed
‘‘nonpharmaceutical interventions,’’ to
stave off the worst effects of a pandemic
until a vaccine could be produced and
widely administered (4, 5). Because many
of these interventions, such as closing
schools or shutting down mass transit,
could be very disruptive to society, it is
important to use effective measures in
a rational way. But which measures are
most effective, and how should they be
applied? Do any nonpharmaceutical inter-
ventions actually help? Until now, there
has been very little systematic examination
of these questions. However, different
U.S. cities showed marked differences in
influenza attack rates and mortality in
1918. Some cities, St. Louis for example,
appeared to have weathered the pandemic
with far fewer excess deaths than others
(6, 7). What distinguished the severely
afflicted cities from those that were less
heavily stricken? As it happens, different
cities took different approaches to imple-
menting interventions. These differences
constituted natural experiments and offer
an opportunity to address important ques-
tions concerning nonpharmaceutical inter-
ventions by using the historical data. In
this issue of PNAS, Hatchett et al. (6) and
Bootsma and Ferguson (7) have made
important contributions to our under-
standing of these questions by using the
historical data approach to examine the
effects of various interventions used dur-
ing the 1918 pandemic.
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions in 1918
A variety of interventions were available
in 1918, from wearing surgical masks to
‘‘social distancing’’ measures (as we call
them today) that ranged from closing
schools and prohibiting public gatherings
to isolating sick people in hospitals or en-
couraging them to stay home. Most of the
interventions then available are identical
to the measures that would be considered
today (8). Both articles reach similar con-
clusions, using complementary methods.
In the 1918 pandemic, no single interven-
tion was sufficient, although some inter-
ventions were more useful than others. As
might be expected for a respiratory infec-
tion, closing schools, churches, and the-
aters, for example, appeared to be among
the most effective measures. Four or more
such interventions implemented at the
same time were more effective than only
one or two and were more effective than
multiple interventions started at different
times (6). Of course, this activity might
also be a proxy for how seriously a city
viewed the pandemic. Nevertheless, there
were significant differences. Timing was
especially critical. Both articles demon-
strate that these measures were far more
effective if applied early and maintained
as long as possible. Cities that put several
measures in place early (before the cumu-
lative excess death rate reached 20–30/
100,000 population) experienced peak
death rates that were approximately half
of those seen in cities that started their
interventions later. The authors note that
few cities maintained the interventions for
6 weeks, approximately the time it took
for one wave of the pandemic to pass
through the area. Influenza returned
when the interventions were relaxed. Pan-
demics have tended to come in waves, so
a city could implement effective measures
and avoid the first wave, only to relax
them and be hit by the next. Bootsma and
Ferguson (7), in fact, make the interesting
argument that escaping the pandemic en-
tirely may not be the most advantageous
strategy because it only leaves everyone
susceptible to infection later. How does
one keep up the necessary caution for
what may be months or longer? Experi-
ences from 1918 suggest that it was possi-
ble to get reasonable compliance with
precautionary measures for a while, but
not indefinitely, even in the more obedi-
ent social climate that prevailed in 1918.
San Francisco had demonstrations in
which citizens defiantly tore off their own
masks (9). Obtaining long-term compli-
ance is likely to be even more difficult
today, although there was a relatively high
level of public compliance with recom-
mended infection control measures during
the severe acute respiratory syndrome
(SARS) epidemic in Toronto. These
experiences suggest that, although it is
difficult to maintain compliance, it is not
impossible.
Despite the difficulties, nonpharmaceu-
tical interventions can fulfill lifesaving
objectives. Spreading out the peak of in-
fection over a longer period of time could
reduce the burden on healthcare institu-
tions and essential services. A chief pur-
pose of nonpharmaceutical interventions
today would be to reduce the effects of
the pandemic as much as possible until
vaccine could be produced and adminis-
tered. In that case, people might be more
willing to accept these precautions for
several months, knowing that eventually
the restrictions would end. Hope is a
strong inducement.
Are We Better Off Today?
These considerations have direct rele-
vance to our concerns today. The findings
of Hatchett et al. (6) and Bootsma and
Ferguson (7) support the general idea of
‘‘social distancing’’ that is the keystone of
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strategies and indicate that some interven-
tions were probably of little value. As with
any historical data, extrapolations to the
present must be made with caution. There
are significant social and technological
differences between 1918 and today. In
today’s increasingly globalized world,
when we can circumnavigate the planet
within the incubation period of an influ-
enza infection, can the pandemic be spot-
ted and the right interventions applied in
time to be effective? This question em-
phasizes the critical need for effective sur-
veillance and response. However, the
work at hand does provide some cause for
limited optimism, suggesting that, even at
today’s rapid pace, if a city acts quickly it
can buy time even when the pandemic
appears at its gates. Another difference
between 1918 and now is the increasing
urbanization, which also makes more of
the world vulnerable. In the earlier years
of the 20th century, there were far greater
differences between urban and rural ar-
eas. Since then, cities have grown larger,
more numerous, and more densely packed
with inhabitants. Far more commonly
than in 1918, many people commute daily
to large cities. Finally, there are differ-
ences in the makeup of the household,
with increasing numbers being headed by
single parents or having both parents
working. Closing schools would be far
more burdensome for many in our current
setting than it was in 1918.
To be sure, we do have a number of
advantages over 1918. Some of the victims
then may have been carried off by second-
ary bacterial infections that might be
treatable today. Antiviral medications may
also be available, and for those of the
sickest patients who have access to inten-
sive care, ventilators might save more
lives. Infection control measures are
somewhat better, too, at least for health-
care workers, with more effective respira-
tory protection. But most of all, one
hopes that vaccine could become rapidly
available. Since the 1950s, vaccines have
been the definitive strategy for combating
influenza epidemics, and this is unlikely to
change in the foreseeable future. Even
with only enough vaccine for part of the
population, and imperfect distribution,
‘‘herd immunity’’ can have a considerable
protective effect if sufficient vaccine can
be administered in time (10). But under
current circumstances, with global vaccine
capacity severely limited (11), it may well
require a pandemic to see whether this is
even a realistic hope. The state of the
world’s vaccine capacity is deplorable and
sorely in need of improvement. Even
worse, with only a handful of countries
that produce vaccines, the suffering could
be exacerbated by regional socioeconomic
inequities in distribution (12), a concern
recently underscored by Indonesia’s objec-
tions to providing new virus samples to
the World Health Organization.
Progress and Paradox
The history of the 1918 pandemic also
leaves us with some unresolved paradoxes.
We have made great progress in charac-
terizing the influenza virus and even cru-
cial aspects of its pathogenesis. In recent
years, the 1918 virus itself has been pieced
together from painstakingly assembled
portions of viral RNA sequences (13), and
reasons for the unusual virulence of the
virus are beginning to be unraveled (14).
Despite the many years that have passed
since 1918, however, there is much about
the transmission, stability, and epidemiol-
ogy of influenza that is still very poorly
understood (5). One frustrating apparent
paradox is the difficulty of reducing
spread effectively. The work by Bootsma
and Ferguson (7) utilizes the classic trans-
mission model so effectively elaborated by
Anderson and May (15). A key parameter
in the model is R0, the basic reproductive
rate of the infection, which essentially
states how many susceptible individuals
each infected person would (on the aver-
age) infect. Thus, any infection with R0 
1 would sputter out quickly. Calculations
by the present authors and others suggest
that R0 was 2 for the 1918 pandemic.
Although exponential growth by powers
of 2—the ultimate consequence of R0 
2—can be expected to give large numbers
of cases if unchecked, it is perhaps sur-
prising that the panoply of measures de-
signed to interrupt transmission was still
insufficient to bring R below 1, which
would seem to require a reduction in
transmission of only 60%.
Learning from History
That the historical data from 1918 still
have such great utility today is both
a demonstration of the value of history
and a great irony in itself. The irony is
that now, almost 90 years after the worst
pandemic in recorded history, we still
have so little understanding of many fun-
damental aspects of influenza transmis-
sion that we must rely on empirical results
almost a century old. Clearly, much more
research is needed to better understand
influenza epidemiology and transmission,
to design useful interventions, and to de-
velop the technology to produce the nec-
essary vaccines rapidly and in quantity.
Even with a thorough understanding of
these issues, however, historical data can
clearly offer valuable insights that are
highly relevant to today’s concerns—
insights that in some cases can be ob-
tained in no other way. Some have used
the term ‘‘clioepidemiology’’ (after Clio,
the muse of history) to refer to the min-
ing and reanalysis of this rich store of
often-neglected historical information
(16). As these articles show, there is an
invaluable treasure trove of useful histori-
cal data that has only just begun to be
used to inform our actions. The lessons of
1918, if well heeded, might help us to
avoid repeating the same history today.
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